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Abstract: 
We examine the value of smoking prohibitions by developing a model of the rent differential 
between smoking and nonsmoking properties. We empirically test for the rent differential using a 
data set of vacation rental properties from the Outer Banks of North Carolina. Given peak season 
rents, hedonic variables such as oceanfront location, and number of bedrooms and bathrooms 
price according to expectations. Distance from vehicular congestion also leads to greater rent, 
reflecting vacationer desires for beauty as well as peace and quiet. Most significantly, our results 
reveal that vacationers are willing to pay substantial additional rent for properties that prohibit 
smoking. Understanding the demand for smoking prohibitions is important to academics, 
professionals, and others associated with owning, operating, and financing real estate. 
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1. Introduction 
Every summer, millions of households head for the beach. Once there, many stay in beach 
houses rented from individual owners. Vacation homes make up only 2.8 percent of the nation's 
housing stock, but in some beach resort areas they accommodate more visitors than traditional 
hotels and motels (see U.S. HUD, 1998, p. 85). The popularity of vacation- home rental property 
is supported by the income tax code, which allows owners to exclude two weeks of rental 
income or to charge off depreciation and other expenses against reported rents. These tax 
incentives allow vacation-home owners to rent equivalent or greater space at rates competitive 
with those at conventional resorts, hotels, and motels. 
 
This study examines the factors that influence weekly rental rates of vacation rental properties 
with a special focus on the value of smoking prohibitions contained in some of the vacation 
rental property leases. A smoking prohibition (that is, a ban on the use of tobacco on the 
premises) is a residential amenity associated with some vacation rental properties. Our study uses 
a sample of vacation rental properties located on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, a prime 
East Coast rental destination, obtained during the peak rental season of the summer of 1998. In 
this barrier island market, vacation properties are typically rented to families on a weekly basis. 
The week begins on Saturday afternoon and ends the following Saturday morning, allowing for 
adequate time to clean (if necessary) and inspect the unit prior to the next rental. The weekly 
rents for these family oriented properties range from a minimum of $375 to a maximum of 
$3,850. The peak season (also known as "in season''), which covers our period of rental price 
investigation, begins during the third week of June and ends after the third week of August. 
Specific factors of interest include renters' willingness to pay for oceanfront location, for lower 
traffic density, and for smoking prohibitions. We also examine the data for spatial 
autocorrelation. 
 
The valuation of smoking prohibitions is expected to provide insights relevant to other markets 
that have smoking bans. The second section of the article provides background information 
regarding vacation property and the valuation of specific property attributes. A model of 
smoking prohibition and rent is presented in the third section. In Section 4, sample data from 
vacation homes offered for rent by the week and located on the Outer Banks of North Carolina 
are discussed. The empirical methodology and results from estimating the value of smoking 
prohibitions are reported in Section 5. A summary and concluding remarks are found in Section 
6. 
 
2. Literature review 
Other studies have examined the monetary costs of smoking to society, but few have looked at 
the interrelationship between real estate rental values and smoking prohibitions. Several authors 
have examined the value of beachfront location and vacation homes. Most recently, Benson et al. 
(1997, 1998) explore the relative values of water access and water views using data sets of 
single-family properties that were sold and that were located in the state of Washington.1 
 
To explain the actual rent paid in the market for rental units, most studies draw on hedonic price 
theory. This hedonic approach is developed in the work of Lancaster (1971), Rosen (1974), and 
others. This literature has been reviewed by Jud et al. (1996). More recently, Pace et al. (1998) 
recommend the use of spatial statistics to control for the clustering of residuals associated with 
real estate regressions and to allow for better prediction and more efficient estimation. We 
therefore geocode the vacation rental property observations by assigning a latitude and longitude 
coordinate for each transaction.2 
 
Most studies employ some variation of the following model: 
 
where Ri is rent of the ith rental unit, Di = distance, Li = a vector of variables describing the 
location of the ith unit, Ai is a vector of variables describing the amenities of the ith 
 
unit, Vi is a vector of variables describing the average vacancy rate of the ith unit, LLi is a vector 
of variables that assigns a latitude and longitude coordinate for each transaction, and ui is a 
stochastic term. This hedonic approach looks at rent as being determined by the location and 
other attributes (or amenities) of the property. 
 
While the literature relating to apartment and hotel rents is very extensive, we are unaware of 
any studies dealing with vacation rental property. 
 
3. A model of smoking prohibitions and rent 
Drawing from recent hedonic pricing literature concerning apartment and single-family 
residential attribute valuation, we propose a model of rent pricing where consumers view 
smoking prohibitions as a benefit. In a market of symmetric information for vacation rental 
housing, renters choose from properties with smoking prohibitions and those without. Smoking 
prohibitions are generally enforced by the loss of the renter's substantial security deposit 
(approximately $400). Given vacation properties with and without smoking prohibitions, renters 
are assumed to rent identical dwellings so as to allow the consumption of other housing attributes 
to be suppressed in the renter's utility function (see Benjamin et al., 1998). 
 
In recent years, many nonsmokers have expressed a desire for a nonsmoking environment. State 
and local regulations have often been enacted to accommodate the nonsmoking voting 
constituency. In many states, the imposition of regulations has mandated either a nonsmoking 
environment or a choice for customers. Even in the absence of regulation, many service 
organizations such as hotels and restaurants have increasingly catered to the desires of their 
many nonsmoking customers by offering them nonsmoking sections in their facilities. The extent 
to which they are able to cater to customer preferences depends on the size of the facility and on 
demand. 
 
Likewise, owners of vacation rental properties may choose to have either a smoking or 
nonsmoking facility. Because owners usually use their rental property themselves in the off-
season, one might reasonably assume that only owners who are nonsmokers would offer 
nonsmoking vacation properties for rent. This might be true for personal preference reasons and 
for economic reasons (such as reducing costs associated with smoking clients) or because 
landlords expect higher rents received from nonsmoking customers. The important consideration 
is that vacation rental property owners elect to have either a smoking or nonsmoking facility. 
 
This choice is complicated by a number of factors, such as (1) conversion of existing properties 
to nonsmoking at an initial cleanup cost and the need to sustain periodic, recurring maintenance 
costs (some customers may break the rules), (2) differences in the vacancy rates of smoking and 
nonsmoking properties, and (3) uncertainty of the size and duration of the rent premium for 
nonsmoking facilities. The initial cost of converting a smoking to a nonsmoking property may 
include repair of furniture, carpets, and draperies caused by burns as well as removing the long-
lasting effects of smoke stains and odors. With a renovation of an existing facility or the 
construction of a new facility there should be little if any additional costs incurred. Conversions 
of existing facilities, however, incur this cost. 
 
We model the owner's decision and the rental rate for nonsmoking facilities as a capital 
budgeting decision. Let NCFNS represent the additional net cash flow of a nonsmoking facility 
versus a smoking facility. Inspite of the aforementioned initial cost of a converting to a 
nonsmoking facility, the relative "newness'' of the idea of nonsmoking vacation properties might 
lead one to expect that early entrants to this market would earn higher than normal profits, but 
that this nonnormal profit would disappear over time. 
 
Let INS (1— T) and NCFNS represent the initial additional up-front (after-tax) cost and the initial 
additional net cash flow, respectively, of the nonsmoking facility relative to a smoking facility. A 
declining growth function is represented by f (g, t), where g is the rate of growth and t is time. 
The discounted value of future net cash-flows function is denoted by h(r, t), where r is the 
discount rate and t is time. The net present value of converting an existing facility from smoking 
to nonsmoking. NPVNS,E’ with net benefits extending N periods (until NCFNS = NCFS), is 
 
For a renovated or new facility, the initial up-front incremental cost is avoided; however, there is 
a delay until time R when these nonsmoking facilities will be available for rent. The net present 
value of a nonsmoking facility for a new or newly renovated facility, NPVNS,N’ is 
 
From an economic perspective, the owner's decision is whether to convert now (equation (2)) or 
wait until day R for the scheduled renovation. Subtracting equation (3) from equation (2) yields 
this change in net present value: 
 
By setting equation (4) equal to zero and solving for NCFNS’ the break-even net cash flow point 
is determined as follows: 
 
To arrive at the break-even rent level, we decompose the net cash flow into the rental rates (RS 
and RNS) and ongoing expenditures (ES and ENS) for smoking and nonsmoking options, and the 
number of days of occupancy by renters (DS,R and DNS,R) for both choices, all adjusted for taxes. 
The loss of utility to the owner of not smoking in a nonsmoking unit is converted to a monetary 
equivalent expenditure. The owner loses UNS of utility per day for DNS,OW days when the unit is 
occupied by the owner. The difference in net cash flow for a smoking versus nonsmoking 
property is 
 
Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) and simplifying the resulting expression renders the 
following: 
 
A simple declining growth function is specified as f (g, t) = (1 — g)
-t
 and a discount function as 
h(r, t) = (1 + r)
—
t. Substituting these as growth and discount functions into equation (7) yields 
 
Equation (8) indicates that the rental rate charged by the owner of a preexisting property, after 
conversion to a nonsmoking facility, a rate also based on the alternative of waiting until the next 
refurbishing cycle. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (8) is the amortized cost per 
day based on days of occupancy; it is adjusted for the rate of decrease in rent rate (g) owing to 
increasing competition as properties are converted, and there is an adjustment for the required 
return (discount rate) for use of capital. The larger g is, the faster the introduction of nonsmoking 
units and the larger the initial rent. A larger discount rate also increases the initial rent. The 
second term on the RHS is the daily expenditure on the nonsmoking facility. The third term is 
the net revenue (after expenses) of the smoking property adjusted for the relative level of 
occupancy between smoking and nonsmoking facilities. This term represents the opportunity 
cost of lost net revenue when converting from a smoking to a nonsmoking facility. The last term 
indicates the additional rent that the owner charges to compensate him or her for not smoking in 
the nonsmoking unit. The utility loss is in monetary terms and is adjusted by the number of days 
occupied by the owners relative to the number of days rented. 
 
In the long run, all units are subject to renovation, so that INS is equal to zero. Also, in the long 
run, markets equilibrate so that there is no differential in the vacancy rates of smoking and 
nonsmoking units. Thus, the long-run rent differential is expected to be 
If, as expected, the maintenance expenditures for a 
nonsmoking unit are less than those for a smoking unit, the rent differential will be negative 
(when the utility loss is zero). On the other hand, if there is a large utility loss to unit owners 
from not smoking in the nonsmoking unit, then will more than offset the 
negative maintenance differential and the initial rental rate differential will be positive. 
 
4. Sample data 
Our data are drawn from a sample of vacation homes offered for rent by the week during peak 
season summer 1998 on the Outer Banks of North Carolina. The Outer Banks region is an 
expansive barrier island between Albemarle Sound and the Atlantic Ocean, connected to the 
mainland on the north end by Highway 158 and on the southern end by Highway 264. Although 
the year-round population is only about 30,000 persons, the region hosts an average of more than 
300,000 visitors each weekend during the summer. Tourists stay in the small beach communities, 
stretching from Duck in the north to Kitty Hawk, Kill Devil Hills, and Nags Head in the south. 
 
Our 208 rental property sample comes from a large Outer Banks' realtor who maintains 
information regarding property type and physical characteristics as well as location. Rental 
property units range in size from small one-bedroom houses to large seven-bedroom houses, 
which could hold an extended family. Virtually all properties are separate, self- contained 
buildings renting as a single unit. Other amenities include pool, dishwasher, washer/dryer, and 
central air. A prohibition for smoking is of concern for many families who choose to rent the 
properties.3 
 
A uniqueness of our data set is that it represents a small time period of approximately nine weeks 
for a market that has virtually 100 percent occupancy. The strong economy of the summer of 
1998 and the narrowness of the peak season created great demand for vacation rental properties 
with the result being an extensive waiting listing for any available rentals during the peak season. 
Interviews with brokers indicated that there was very little, if any, rental price negotiation. We 
therefore use the asking rental price for the actual rental price. 
 
The requirement for a security deposit has been shown by Benjamin et al. (1998) to be a key 
predictor of rental property rents and, subsequently value. In our data, a security deposit 
requirement is also a nonissue in that each rental property has the same security deposit. 
 
5. Model and empirical results 
We employ a standard hedonic model of rents incorporating 15 independent variables. We adjust 
the model for heteroskedasticity and test for spatial autocorrelation. 
 
To explain the level of rents, we operationalize equation (1) in the log-linear functional form 
commonly utilized in the literature: 
 
 
Rent is the weekly rental rate during the summer peak season. Distance, as measured in degrees, 
is defined from the Wright Brothers Monument. This well-known national monument is one of 
the oldest tourist attractions on the barrier island and traditionally a center of tourist activity. An 
oceanfront unit is one located directly on the Atlantic beach with no view obstruction. A semi-
oceanfront unit is situated one lot back from the beach and may have a partially obstructed view 
of the beach. An oceanside unit is one located 70 to 900 yards from the beach and usually does 
not have a view of the ocean. The condition variables (C1 and C2) measure the effective age of 
the unit. A table showing the means and standard deviations of all variables is included in 
Appendix A. 
 
Estimates of the model are shown in Table 1. The model is estimated using the White (1982) 
procedure for estimating a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form. The adjusted R2 for the estimated model is 0.89 and all of 
the variables, except dishwasher (DWi) and air conditioning (ACi), are statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level or better using a two-tailed test. Appendix B reports very similar regression results 
using the spatial autoregressive response model.4 The spatial autocorrelation coefficients is 0.02, 
which indicates virtually no spatial 
 
autocorrelation. The model specification and data are sufficiently robust, therefore, to use 
standard regression techniques.5 
 
Estimates of our model (equation (9)) reveal that rental rates rise with distance from the Wright 
Brothers National Monument. As a center of activity, the nearby area is often congested with 
tourist vehicles. The positive coefficient on the distance from the monument variable indicates 
that renters are willing to pay additional rent to avoid crowds and congestion. Furthermore, the 
coefficients on the latitude and longitude variables indicate that rental values rise to the north and 
east along the barrier island, the east side of the barrier island being nearer the Atlantic Ocean. 
This indicates that vacationers are willing to pay more to be located nearer the Atlantic Ocean 
and north of the monument. 
 
Among the location variables, the dummy variable for oceanfront location (L1) indicates that 
renters are willing to pay some 60 percent more for a unit on the beach.6 They are willing to pay 
25 percent more for a semi-oceanfront unit (L2), and 9 percent more for ocean side unit (L3). 
The omitted location variable is the sound side location, a clear negative to many of the beach 
vacationers. 
 
The condition variables show the effect of effective age on rents. Units that are essentially new 
(C1) as defined by being five or fewer years old command 20 percent higher rents than those that 
are old, defined as being at least 15 years old. Units of moderate age (C2), those properties 
between these two extremes, bring 8 percent more than older units. 
 
Looking at the various rental unit amenities included in the model reveals an additional bedroom 
raises rents about 18 percent. An extra bathroom increases rent by 12 percent, access to a 
swimming pool brings an additional 18.5 percent more rent, and a washer and dryer in the unit 
raises rent by 10.5 percent. The availability of either a dishwasher or air conditioning has no 
statistically significant effect on rent. 
 
The no-smoking variable (NSi), our variable of primary interest, indicates the value that renters 
place on a smoke-free unit. No-smoking units bring 11.6 percent more rent. Only 6 percent of the 
units in the sample have no-smoking prohibitions.7 As shown in equation (8), the rental premium 
on no-smoking units reflects the cost of converting an existing smoking unit to nonsmoking, the 
relative maintenance expenditures of smoking and nonsmoking units, the utility loss to owners 
from not smoking, and relative vacancy rates. We expect that over time the premium will decline 
as more units are converted to nonsmoking and more nonsmoking units are constructed. In the 
long run, the premium depends on the relative maintenance costs of smoking and nonsmoking 
units and the utility loss to owners from not smoking in their nonsmoking units. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
In this article, we develop a model of smoking prohibitions and rent. The value of smoking 
prohibition is empirically examined using a data set of vacation rental properties from the other 
banks of North Carolina. Employing spatial statistics and using peak season rents, our results 
reveal that vacationers are willing to pay substantial additional rent for properties that prohibit 
smoking. Other property-specific variables such as oceanfront location and number of bedrooms 
and bathroom price according to expectations. Distance from vehicular congestion also leads to 
greater rent, reflecting vacationer desires for beauty and peace and quiet. Understanding the 
demand for smoking prohibitions as exhibited by the rental price increment to be realized is 
important to academics, professionals, and others associated with owing, operating, and 





1. In a study of vacation homes in resort towns, Tirtiroglu (1996) shows that buyers and 
sellers tend to have high search costs and are more likely to use a real estate broker. In 
addition, Tirtiroglu reports that commissions are not only fully capitalized into sales 
prices but that buyers appear to overpay commissions. 
2. Geocoding and spatial statistics allow for a more elaborate spatial analysis than the 
traditional ruler on a paper map technique that generates estimates of distance. See Pace, 
et al. (1998), Pace and Gilley (1998), Dubin (1998), and Basu and Thibodeau (1998) for 
further discussions on its implementation in a hedonic study.  
3. The smoking prohibitions contained in some leases is uniform across the vacation homes 
where it is present. Evidence of smoking or tobacco smoke may result in loss of security 
deposit and loss of vacation home rental privileges. 
4. We used Spatial Statistics Toolbox 1.0 by Kelley Pace and Ron Barry for the spatial 
autocorrelation regressions and thank Kelly Pace for his assistance. 
5. This model has a prediction equation as follows:  
where, R is the vector of rental rates, X is the vector of independent variables as shown in 
equation (9), W is the spatial weight matrix, β is the matrix of independent variable 
regression parameters, ρ is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, and ξ is the error 
vector. Two other spatial models, the simultaneous autoregressive model and the mixed 
autoregressive model, yield even less evidence of spatial autocorrelation. 
6. In a semi-log equation, the percentage impact of a one-unit change in a dummy variable 
(from 0 to 1) can be calculated as 100* (c
α
 - 1), where a is the estimated regression 
coefficient for the dummy variable. We apply this transformation throughout in the 
discussion of the impacts of various dummy variables on rents. See Halvorsen and 
Palmquist (1980) for a discussion of how to interpret dummy variables when the 
dependent variable is expressed in logs. 
7. An anonymous referee suggested that we introduce the square of bedrooms and 
bathrooms and an interaction between bedrooms and bathrooms into the model as a test 
of the model specification. This new specification, however, had virtually no effect on the 
estimated size of the no-smoking coefficient, which was 0.10 with a t-value of 2.39 in the 
reestimated model. The same referee also suggested that we test for the influence of 
outlying observations. We reestimated the model eliminating all observations that had 
residual errors more than 2 standard deviations from the mean. This also did not 
substantially alter our conclusions about the significance of the no-smoking coefficient, 
although the reestimated coefficient was somewhat larger, with a value of 0.14 and a t-
value of 4.45. 
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